What do voters in Northern Ireland think about the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland / Windsor Framework?

 

David Phinnemore, Katy Hayward and Lisa Claire Whitten ^[1]

November 2023

 

The report is available to download here: 

 

Executive Summary

• Majority opinion on the Protocol/Windsor Framework is either generally accepting or supportive of the arrangements that it established for Northern Ireland. However, opinion remains divided with continued opposition among most unionists.
  • 56% of respondents regard the Protocol/Windsor Framework as overall ‘a good thing for Northern Ireland’. This is the same as in our previous poll in June 2023. 58% see the Protocol/Windsor Framework as an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland.
  • 6 in 10 respondents (60%) agree that the Windsor Framework is the best available compromise for addressing the concerns of people in Northern Ireland with the original Protocol. One third (33%) disagree.
  • 35% disagree that overall the Protocol/Windsor Framework is ‘a good thing for Northern Ireland’; 34% disagree that it is an appropriate means of managing the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland.
  • More than two thirds of respondents (70%) believe particular arrangements for Northern Ireland are necessary to manage the impact of Brexit.
• Views on the political impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework have become slightly more positive; most positive views are on its economic consequences.
  • 55% of respondents think the Protocol/Windsor Framework is having a positive impact on the Northern Ireland economy; 32% disagree. And 65% think it offers unique opportunities that could benefit Northern Ireland.
  • More now see the Protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive (46%) rather than negative (34%) impact on UK-EU relations.
  • On British-Irish relations, the impact has returned to being seen as, on balance, negative (40%, with 37% positive) compared to June 2023 (35% and 43% respectively).
  • Views are split equally (39%) on whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework’s impact on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as positive as negative; a contrast with February 2023 (28% positive, 48% negative).
• There are mixed levels of trust/distrust in political actors and institutions to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • The UK Government is by far the most distrusted (77%) and least trusted (7% trust) of all actors, although there has been a slight improvement in the figures since June 2023 (80% distrust, 4% trust).
  • Voters currently trust (46%) slightly more than they distrust (43%) the European Commission/EU, although the gap has narrowed since June 2023 (49% trust, 41% distrust). In February 2023, voters were evenly split.
  • Northern Ireland business representatives continue to be the only actors enjoying the trust of a majority of respondents (59%); only 16% distrust them.
• Self-declared understanding of the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains high, with a substantial majority of respondents (74%) claiming ‘a good understanding’.
• Views are mixed on new arrangements to allow voices from Northern Ireland to be heard on the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • Voters are almost evenly split on whether the Stormont Brake provides ‘a welcome opportunity to exercise democratic control over changes/updates to EU law applicable in Northern Ireland: 38% agree, 36% disagree.
  • Most voters (53%) agree, however, that UK and EU engagement with stakeholders in Northern Ireland should mean fewer difficulties in the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; 29% disagree.
• Respondents remain divided on how their MLAs should vote in the 2024 ‘democratic consent’ vote, but with a larger proportion supporting a vote in favour.
  • More than half of respondents (56%) currently favour MLAs voting for the continued application of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework; 34% want MLAs to vote against. The difference is unchanged since June 2023.
  • Almost two thirds of respondents (64%) agree that with the Windsor Framework, the Assembly and Executive should be restored and fully-functioning. Almost a third (31%) disagree.
  • A significant minority of voters remain opposed to the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Almost three quarters (23%) will only vote for candidates in a Northern Ireland Assembly election who are in favour of its scrapping.
• Most voters have a negative view of Brexit.
  • 6 in 10 respondents (60%) do not think that Brexit is overall ‘a good thing’ for the United Kingdom, most (51%) strongly so.
  • A majority (69%) agree that the UK should pursue closer relations with the EU to reduce frictions on the movement of goods; 17% disagree.
  • 70% of Leave voters in NI believe that the promises of the 2016 Leave campaign have not been forthcoming, 67% still believe that Brexit is a good thing for the UK and would not change how they voted in 2016.
  • Less than a third (31%) agree that future UK governments should rule out the option of the UK rejoining the EU. The majority (59%) disagree.

 

Introduction

As part of a now extended four-year ESRC-funded research project on the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/ Northern Ireland, a series of regular polls has been commissioned to ‘temperature test’ voter attitudes on a range of issues relating to Brexit, the Protocol, and their implications for Northern Ireland. This is the only polling in Northern Ireland dedicated to the topic of the Protocol (now also known as the ‘Windsor Framework’) and which has been running at regular intervals since the Protocol entered fully into force on 1 January 2021 following the end of the transition period.

The polls are being conducted every four months during 2021-2024 by LucidTalk using its online Northern Ireland Opinion Panel. LucidTalk have a strong track record of accurately predicting election and referendum results in Northern Ireland on the basis of polling this Opinion Panel. The results presented here are from a sample of 1104 responses to the poll undertaken on 20-23 October 2023. The poll was completed by 2751 respondents. The sample of responses used is weighted to be representative of the adult population of Northern Ireland (e.g. by age, gender, region). All results presented are accurate to a margin of error of +/-2.6% at 95% confidence.

The context for this poll

This ninth poll was conducted more than two-and-a-half years after the end of the 11-month transition period that followed the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020. It was the fourth poll of 2023 following regular polls in early February 2023 and in June 2023 and an ‘Extra’ poll carried out in March 2023 following the adoption of the Windsor Framework at the end of February. Previous polls were carried out in March 2021, June 2021 and October 2021 and February 2022 and June 2022 and October 2022.

Most of our previous regular polls were conducted in a context of ongoing contestation around the Protocol and often strained UK-EU relations. This poll took place against the backdrop of significantly improved UK-EU relations, UK-EU adoption and implementation of the Windsor Framework, and repeated statements from the UK government that the Windsor Framework represented the best possible deal available and it was thus not open to any renegotiation with the EU.

The significance of the Windsor Framework is that it phases in a set of arrangements designed to ease the movement of retail goods – including agri-food products – into Northern Ireland from Great Britain via what the UK Government refers to as a ‘green lane’ for ‘trusted traders’. Its launch was 1 October 2023 and proceeded relatively smoothly. The Windsor Framework also brings easements in the Protocol’s original requirements for the movement of pets, parcels, medicines, and certain plants into Northern Ireland. The ‘grace periods’ are therefore being phased out. Accompanying all this are strict obligations around monitoring and enforcement of the Windsor Framework – ‘robust safeguards’ in the words of the European Commission.

A further dimension to the Windsor Framework seeks to increase opportunities for the interests of Northern Ireland to be heard more in the implementation of the Protocol. It therefore envisages increased engagement of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) and other stakeholders from Northern Ireland regarding amendments, adjustments and additions to the EU law applying in Northern Ireland and includes the introduction of a ‘Stormont Brake’ (available for use when the Northern Ireland Assembly has been restored).

Since the adoption of the Windsor Framework in February 2023, UK-EU relations have entered a period of relative political stability and increased cooperation. The joint EU-UK bodies overseeing implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework are now meeting regularly: the EU-UK Joint Committee has met three times compared to only once in the previous eighteen months; and the EU-UK Specialised Committee has met at least five times. The UK and the EU have also been adopting legislation needed for implementing the Windsor Framework.

Despite the efforts of the UK government and the EU to ensure in the Windsor Framework that important concerns about the Protocol raised by people in Northern Ireland have been addressed, agreement on the Windsor Framework has not… yet at least… led to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreeing to the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive and so the return of devolved government. During local elections on 18 May 2023, the DUP did cautiously welcome the Windsor Framework as ‘undoubtedly representing significant progress across a number of issues’, but made it clear that ‘more work is required by the UK Government if we are to secure the necessary conditions for a return of the Northern Ireland Executive’. The DUP’s blocking of the return of the Assembly and Executive in protest at the Protocol/Windsor Framework has been criticised by almost all other political parties represented in the Assembly. Nevertheless, it is a policy that has been endorsed by its supporters, something that is reflected in the findings of the polling here. Talks between the UK government and the DUP to address concerns and secure a return of the Assembly and Executive are ongoing.

Respondents to the poll on 20-23 October 2023 were asked six sets of questions and offered the opportunity to provide written comments in response to the poll. The questions covered attitudes towards Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework, assessments of the latter’s impact, and trust in different actors to manage Northern Ireland’s interest regarding the Protocol/Windsor Framework. The poll also asked participants how they would like MLAs to vote in the ‘democratic consent’ vote on Articles 5-10 of the Protocol/Windsor Framework that will be held at the end of 2024 and the importance of the Protocol for voting preference in a future Northern Ireland Assembly election. Two final sections sought views on further questions concerning the Windsor Framework and on Brexit and the future of UK-EU relations more generally.

Attitudes to Brexit and the Protocol

This latest polling continues to show most voters in Northern Ireland as either generally accepting or supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. However, opinion remains divided with continued opposition among many unionists to the Protocol/Windsor Framework arrangements. The slight warming to the Protocol under the Windsor Framework noted following the June 2023 poll is reflected in the findings of this latest poll where levels of support are generally marginally higher than in previous Testing the Temperature polls. Opposition to the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains firm.

Three quarters of respondents claim a ‘good understanding’ of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 1). The proportion of respondents who think that reliable information exists on the Protocol/Windsor Framework (54%) remains markedly higher than in 2022 (44-47%) and above the lowest level recorded to date of 37% in March 2021. However, some concerns about misinformation around the Protocol/Windsor Framework and the lack of information available on recent UK-EU discussions were noted in written comments (see below).

More than two thirds of respondents (70%) agree that ‘particular arrangements’ for Northern Ireland are needed to manage the effects of Brexit. This is the same as in October 2022 and February 2023, but slightly lower than in June 2023 (73%). The proportion of all respondents being strongly of this view (48%) is just below the highest figure recorded (50%) in June 2023 and June 2022.

Figure 1. Opinion of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

The proportion of respondents who agree or strongly agree that, with the Windsor Framework, the Protocol provides an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit for Northern Ireland stands at 58%, down on the 61% in June 2023, but still higher than the 53-54% in previous polls when the question focused on the Protocol with the grace periods. A majority of respondents (56%) continue to regard the Protocol with the Windsor Framework as ‘on balance, a good thing’ for Northern Ireland. As in June 2023, this is above the five previous polls when 50-53% thought the Protocol was on balance a ‘good thing’ for Northern Ireland. In June 2021, the figure was lower at 43% (see Figure 2). Of note is that most ‘agree’ respondents now ‘agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’. In terms of respondents disagreeing with the proposition, the overall figure of 35% is in line with the June 2023 poll (34%) but lower than in the three previous polls in February 2023 (41%), October 2022 (39%) and June 2022 (37%).

On whether Brexit itself is on balance ‘a good thing for the UK’, there continues to be a clear majority 60% who disagree. This is broadly in line with polls earlier in 2023 (June – 2%; February – 59%). A slender majority (51%) is strongly of that opinion (down from 55% in June 2023 which was the highest level across the polls to date). The proportion of respondents (32%) who agree that Brexit is on balance ‘a good thing’ for the UK is in line with earlier polls in June 2023 (31%), February 2023 (34%) and October 2022 (32%), and among the lowest figures from polls to date. 

Figure 2. The Protocol/Windsor Framework is on balance ‘a good thing’ for Northern Ireland (%)

Majority acceptance of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework is also reflected in responses to the question on whether the Protocol provides Northern Ireland with a ‘unique set of post-Brexit economic opportunities compared to the rest of the UK which if exploited could benefit Northern Ireland’. Just under two-thirds of respondents (65%) agree that there are economic opportunities to be had from the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 7 below). The figure is down on June 2023 (68%) which was the highest it has been since our first poll in March 2021. A quarter of respondents (25%) disagree, a figure in line with the lower end of the range in the six previous polls (24-29%) and significantly lower than in June 2021 (34%).

Views on the impact of the Protocol

The poll asked respondents for their assessment of the current impact of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework being implemented. Important to note here is that the phased implementation of the Windsor Framework removes the ‘grace periods’ for the application of some of the Protocol’s provisions and replaces them with the new ‘green lane’ arrangements for reducing and in some cases removing formalities, checks and controls on the movement of goods into Northern Ireland from Great Britain. An important implementation milestone came on 1 October 2023 when initial green lane arrangements came into operation.

Opinions remain divided on the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 3) yet there is evidence of some shifts that suggest an easing of political tensions and increased acceptance of the Protocol during the last year.

Figure 3. Overall assessment of the current impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

As in previous polls, a majority of respondents (55%) see the Protocol impacting negatively on political stability in Northern Ireland. While the figure remains high, as in June 2023 (54%), it is down on the 59-68% in previous polls, suggesting that the adoption of the Windsor Framework earlier in 2023 has had a small moderating influence on the Protocol’s political impact. The polling also indicates, as it did in June 2023, slightly more positive views on the Protocol/Windsor Framework’s impact on British-Irish and UK-EU relations. In February 2023, a majority of voters viewed the impact of the Protocol as clearly negative (British-Irish relations – 58%; UK-EU relations – 57%). With the Windsor Framework, the figures are much lower (40% and 34% respectively). Indeed, the impact of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework on UK-EU relations is perceived to be positive by more voters (46%), although this is slightly down on June 2023 (49%). As regards British-Irish relations, there has been a more marked drop in the proportion of voters (37%) perceiving the impact of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework as positive compared to June 2023 (43%). Indeed whereas in June 2023 more voters saw the impact as positive than negative (43% v 35%), the balance had switched by October 2023 (37% v 40%).

The proportion of respondents seeing the Protocol’s current impact as negative on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position in the UK (43%) is in line with June 2023 (42%) and so lower than in February 2023 (50%) but still only marginally lower than in June 2022 (46%); the proportion seeing the Protocol’s current impact on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as negative (39%) is also in line with June 2023 (40%) and so lower than in February 2023 (48%) and October 2022 (47%), and markedly lower than in October 2021 (60%). As many voters (39%) currently see the impact of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as positive. This is almost unchanged since June 2023 (40%). Voters are clearly divided along identity lines: more than four fifths of ‘strongly unionist’ and a clear majority of ‘slightly unionist’ voters view the impact as negative; around three in five nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters view the impact as positive.

On the impact of the Protocol on ensuring ‘no diminution’ of individual rights as set out in the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, the gap between those who see the current impact of the Protocol as positive (49%) and those who view the current impact as negative (33%) remains essentially unchanged since June 2023 when the figures were 48% and 34% respectively. It continues, therefore, to be significantly wider than in February 2023 (43% positive to 41% negative) and is closer to the figures in June 2022 (48% positive to 37% negative).

On the question of the impact of the Protocol on the economy of Northern Ireland, over half of respondents (55%) currently view it as positive (up from 50% in February 2023 and 51% in October 2022 to be almost in line with the 55% in June 2022); 32% view the impact as negative. The figures reflect only slight changes since June 2023: 54% positive, 34% negative). Again, respondents are clearly divided along identity lines: almost three quarters of ‘strongly unionist’ voters regard the impact as negative; ‘slightly unionist’ voters are evenly split; three quarters of ‘neutral’ voters and almost nine out of ten nationalist voters view the impact as positive.

Most respondents continue to view the Protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on protecting the 1998 Agreement. Currently, 48% are of this view, down slightly on June 2023 (50%), but up on February 2023 (44%) and so back in line with June 2022 (50%) and October 2022 (47%). The proportion of respondents who view the impact as negative remains at 37%.

By February 2023, almost equal proportions of respondents viewed the impact of the Protocol on north-south cooperation as negative and positive. The widening of the gap evident in June 2023 (51% viewing the impact as positive and 33% negative) remains: 50% positive and 34% negative.

Written comments expressing positive and negative views

Views expressed in the optional written comments section of the poll were also divided. It is important to note, however, that the reporting of these comments is not weighted to be representative.^[2]

Among those expressing negative views of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, most are opposed to it in principle, while a smaller proportion oppose its practical implications. Among the comments opposing the Protocol/Windsor Framework in principle or effect were:

Negative in Principle

“Get rid of the whole Protocol, it’s undemocratic.”

“As long as any EU laws or jurisdiction still apply in Northern Ireland then it is NOT wholly part of the UK.”

“Place the EU border where it should be – between the UK and the EU, not the UK and the UK.”

“The Windsor Framework is a sell-out of Northern Ireland and must be scrapped before the Executive is restored. On balance, had I known our government would betray us, I may have voted remain in the referendum as the lesser of two evils.”

Negative in Effect

“The Framework is making it hard for every day hard working individuals and businesses to go about their business.”

“Windsor Framework will mean higher costs and less choice for consumers. It may be good for business but will not [benefit] end users with postage / product selection and trade deals in future meaning Northern Ireland will lose out.”

“We are forced to align with the Republic of Ireland and products from there are more available than those from mainland UK. I personally have had problems getting things sent to NI from UK [GB] – hoover battery, dog cage, replacement gate, fireplace slate – if you look on any online selling site, it now frequently excludes NI addresses.”

Among those who expressing a positive view of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, half see it as a ‘least-worst’ mitigation in the context of Brexit; half see it as potentially beneficial or already beneficial for Northern Ireland:

Positive as ‘Least Worst’ in View of Brexit

“Brexit was a terrible decision to be thrust on NI. Whilst the WF is not perfect, it is required, but political leaders, especially those who pushed Brexit on us, should be held to account and made to find ways to benefit from the Framework.”

“Brexit is a disaster for the whole UK an everyone, including the DUP, knows it. NI has been given the least worst outcome and we need to embrace it and not be distracted by people who want to turn the clock back 50years to a time when there was no democratic and they had everything their own way.”

“Brexit was a DISASTER. The Windsor Framework is a necessary result of this disastrous outcome.”

“Brexit disaster…Windsor Framework necessary.”

Positive as Potentially or Already Beneficial

“The Protocol is essential to the economic success of NI and needs to be maintained. People here did not vote for Brexit and do not accept it, and that needs to be recognised. Ironically, acceptance of the NIP is the best opportunity [for] maintaining NI as part of the UK. Certain politicians though are too blinded to that to see past their own antiquated policies.”

“I voted to remain in the EU. NI could benefit economically by using the Framework to its favour, the benefits need to be promoted and explored by NI business with investment from Invest NI.”

Trust to manage the interests of Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the Protocol

Implementation of the Protocol involves a range of actors. As with all previous polls, the only group that is trusted by a majority to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework are Northern Ireland’s business representatives (59%) (see Figure 4). The level of trust in business representatives is up from 55% in June 2023 and is back to almost the highest recorded across our polls (60% in June 2022).

Figure 4. Levels of trust in/distrust of actors to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

Trust in the UK Government when it comes to managing the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (7%) has increased since June 2023 (4%) but remains extremely low. Indeed, almost four fifths of respondents (77%) continue to distrust the UK Government, but as in June 2023 (80%) this is down from 85% in February 2023. The largest proportion of respondents distrust the UK Government ‘a lot’ (42%), although this is an improvement on the 55% in June 2022.

By contrast, trust in the European Commission/EU to manage the Protocol/Windsor Framework in the interests of Northern Ireland has dropped from 49% in June 2023 to 46% and so closer to February 2023 (44%). Trust in the Irish Government stands at 44% (compared to 43% in June 2023 and 38% in February 2023). Distrust in the Irish Government has increased to 45% since June 2023 (42%) and is now almost back to the level recorded in February 2023 (46%); distrust in the European Commission/EU stands at 43%, slightly up February 2023 (41%).

Trust in the Northern Ireland Executive to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains strikingly low (15%). Only the UK Government suffers lower levels of trust. Distrust of the Northern Ireland Executive to manage Northern Ireland’s interests stands at 49%. Given the absence of a functioning Northern Ireland Executive, this latest poll inquired into levels of trust/distrust in Northern Ireland civil servants. Respondents were almost evenly split between trust (35%) and distrust (37%) with slightly fewer respondents (28%) being neutral.

As for the five political parties that formed the last Northern Ireland Executive, the level of trust in the Alliance Party (44%) is the same as in February 2023 having previously peaked at 50% in June 2022 and dropped to 42% in October 2022 and June 2023. The Alliance Party remains, along with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) (42%), one of the two most trusted of the political parties considered here. However, voters distrust Alliance and the SDLP as much as they trust them. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is distrusted least (37% – a further drop compared to 43% in February 2023). Trust in the UUP (32%) is between the figures in June 2023 (34%) and February 2023 (28%). Almost a third of respondents (31% – up from 27% in June 2023) remain undecided on whether they trust the UUP to manage Northern Ireland’s interests on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Two thirds of respondents (66%) continue to distrust the DUP, with almost a majority (49%) also distrusting Sinn Féin. Trust in Sinn Féin on this question has dropped to 36% from 41% in June 2023. Trust in the DUP is unchanged at 27%. Respondents were also asked to consider the extent to which they trust the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. The figures are the same as in June 2023, a majority (64%) distrust the TUV; 27% trust it.

Written comments on politics and political parties in Northern Ireland

Comments provided by respondents for this poll included some general and specific criticisms of politics in Northern Ireland. There was, however, significant criticism of the DUP, with a focus on the party’s approach to the Protocol/Windsor Framework and its decision not to enter a new Northern Ireland Executive in protest against the Protocol:

“The DUP should end its boycott of the Executive immediately, it is punishing ordinary people and achieving nothing.”

“The DUP are a disgrace for abandoning Stormont. People are suffering, particularly as our NHS struggles and waiting lists increase.”

“It should not be forgotten that the DUP went against the democratically expressed wishes of a majority of NI citizens when they supported Brexit. Further, they were central to delivering the hardest possible Brexit. Any current difficulties in NI are almost entirely the fault of the DUP.”

Alongside comments directed at the DUP, a similar proportion of submitted comments stated general frustrations with the lack of fully functioning devolved government in Northern Ireland at present. Others suggested the need for reform:

“I was a nurse for 44yrs and just want to live happily, I don’t understand much about Brexit etc. but I would like to see our politicians back at Stormont to sort out our health service, schools and social welfare problems.”

“The Protocol/Windsor Framework is a long way down our list of problems. The DUP should get back in Stormont or some alternative should be carried out before the whole place falls apart.”

“The Northern Ireland Executive should get back to work already. This is ridiculous. The Windsor Framework is in place and it’s going to work great. It is not going to be removed or altered so the Executive should be up and running by now. The DUP should be ashamed of themselves for letting their people suffer.”

“The Protocol is an excuse for hardline unionists not to govern under a nationalist party. As someone from a PUL background I am disgusted by the lack of leadership and the deep abyss unionists have led the working class into. People are cold and starving – foodbanks are oversubscribed – let’s just get on with the business of governance and lead people to better lives.”

“Change the rules around Stormont so no one party can ever hold up government again!”

“We need to move forward and deal with the damage Brexit has done. No party should be able to hold the entire country to ransom. If they refuse to take their seats, a by-election should be called and a candidate who will sit should be elected.”

Views expressed in the comments were divided, however, with a small number stating support for the DUP’s refusal to enter into an Executive unless the Protocol/Windsor Framework is removed.

“Devolution should not be restored until the DUP’s seven tests are met.”

“DUP tests have not been met yet. No Unionist party should be entering devolved government and implementing the Protocol and Framework as this was the promise to their electorate.”

Also Attracting some notable comment was the extent of misinformation around the Protocol/Windsor Framework and the lack of information available on the Protocol and the recent UK-EU discussions. As this and previous polls have indicated, around two in five respondents have concerns about the availability of reliable information on the Protocol (see Figure 1 above).

“I am a civil servant working on Brexit issues with regards to customs maters. The amount of disinformation out there in the public is shocking. With proper implementation, the Windsor Framework is the best outcome we could hope for. Politicians spin the more ‘negative’ messages for their own political expediency.”

“Up until now the public have not been told the truth about either the Protocol or the Windsor Framework.”

“Brexit was based on lies, false promises, false information. Those who supplied this information should be held to account. NI businesses need to spell out the benefits and losses associated with Brexit. We need facts, real figures, truth…”

Democratic consent and MLAs

The future of core provisions of the Protocol/Windsor Framework – those relating to the movement of goods and the single electricity market (i.e. Articles 5-10) – is subject to the democratic consent of MLAs in a vote that is to be held up to every four years. MLAs will first vote in November/December 2024.

Most respondents (90%) have a view on how they wish their MLAs to vote: 56% in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 and 34% against (see Figure 5). Compared to June 2023, there is a slight drop in each of the preferences but the 22-percentage points gap between them remains unchanged. This reflects an increase – from 6% to 10% – in the proportion of respondents either not interested in how MLAs will vote (5%) or having no preference (5%)

Figure 5. Democratic Consent: Based on what you currently know, and are experiencing now, how would you like the MLAs for whom you vote[d] in the 2022 NI Assembly election to vote in 2024 on the Protocol?

Compared to the regular Testing the Temperature polls prior to the Windsor Framework, this latest poll confirms a widening of the gap in views that has emerged since the June 2021 poll when voters were split almost evenly on how they wished MLAs to vote in 2024 (46% in favour and 45% against). The gap has, however, narrowed since the ‘Extra’ Testing the Temperature poll on the Windsor Framework conducted in March 2023 shortly after its adoption. Then, 61% of respondents wanted MLAs to vote in favour of consent; 32% wanted them to vote against.

As in most previous polls we asked how a candidate’s position on the Protocol might affect a respondent’s willingness to vote for them. If there were an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the next twelve months, the position of a candidate would be a factor for more than four fifths of respondents (84%). Of these, just under a third would vote for candidates either opposed to consent in 2024 (9%) or wanting to see the Protocol scrapped (23%) (see Figure 6). These figures are in line with those in June 2023 (11% and 21% respectively) and February 2023 (12% and 22% respectively) as well as the ‘Extra’ poll in March 2023 (8% and 23%). They show that, despite a warming of views elsewhere towards the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the strength of opposition among a third of voters in Northern Ireland to ‘consent’ being granted to the continuation of the arrangements remains firm. Of particular note is the clear preference among these respondents for the Protocol/Windsor Framework to be scrapped.

Figure 6. Democratic Consent and an NI Assembly Election: If an election to the NI Assembly were held in the next twelve months, how important do you think a candidate’s position on the Protocol would be for your vote? (%)

In terms of support for consent in 2024, just under two in five respondents (38%) would vote for candidates in favour of the continued application of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. This is down on 43% in June 2023 and closer to the pre-Windsor Framework figure of 36% in February 2023. The proportion of respondents who would vote for candidates in favour of the continued application of the Protocol/Windsor Framework would rise to more than half (52%) if there is evidence that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is seen to be benefitting Northern Ireland.

The Windsor Framework… and what might come next

The fifth section of the poll focused on specific aspects of the Windsor Framework and its implications and asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with certain specific statements (See Figure 7). A first question asked whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework, although it remains contested, is realistically the best available compromise for addressing the concerns of people in Northern Ireland on the implementation of the original Protocol. A majority (60%) agree; a third (33%) disagree. The overwhelming majority (≥85%+) of nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters agree; ‘slightly unionist’ voters are split between agree and disagree; and ‘slightly unionist’ voters overwhelming disagree.

Figure 7. The Windsor Framework… and what might come next (%)

A similar response was given to a second question on whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides Northern Ireland with ‘a unique set of post-Brexit economic opportunities compared to the rest of the United Kingdom which if exploited could benefit Northern Ireland’. This is a question that has been asked across all of our polls. As noted above, just under two-thirds of respondents (65%) agree, although the figure is down on June 2023 (68%) which was the highest it has been. A quarter of respondents (25%) disagree. Of note here is that almost two-thirds of ‘slightly unionist’ voters agree that opportunities exist and that these could benefit Northern Ireland. By contrast less than one in five ‘strongly unionist’ voters agree, down from almost one in four in July 2023.

In terms of the changes brought to the Protocol by the Windsor Framework, respondents are almost evenly split on whether the Stormont Brake provides ‘a welcome opportunity to exercise democratic control over changes/updates to EU law applicable in Northern Ireland: 38% agree, 36% disagree and 26% are either ‘neutral’ or ‘don’t know’. Of those who disagree, the majority ‘strongly disagree’. Nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters view the Stormont Brake positively by a ratio of 3:1; ‘slight unionist’ voters are evenly split, while ‘strongly unionist’ voters are more than five times more likely to disagree than agree with the proposition.

Most respondents (53%) agree, however, that UK and EU engagement with stakeholders in Northern Ireland should mean fewer difficulties in the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; 29% disagree. The narrow majority contrasts with the expectations around stakeholder engagement. In June 2023, a clear majority (71%) indicated that they would welcome increased UK-EU engagement with stakeholders in Northern Ireland; this included clear majorities of unionists, nationalists and ‘neutrals’. The overwhelming majority (≥75%+) of nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters agree that UK-EU engagement with stakeholders in Northern Ireland should mean fewer difficulties in the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; ‘slightly unionist’ voters tend to agree more than disagree, while ‘strongly unionist’ voters disagree by a ratio of almost 6:1.

In terms of the impact of the Windsor Framework in shops, 30% of respondents state that GB-produced meat and dairy products that they usually buy are no longer available in the grocery stores/supermarkets they usually use; 44% disagree (see Figure 8). Those responding that such products are no longer available predominantly identify as unionist. Voters identifying as ‘slightly unionist’ are almost evenly split; those identifying as ‘strongly unionist’ are six times more likely to agree than disagree that GB-produced meat and dairy products are no longer available. Less than 10% of ‘neutral’ and nationalist respondents agree. 

Figure 8. The Windsor Framework: product availability and labelling (%)

On the related issue of ‘Not for EU’ labelling appearing in shops – a requirement for GB-produced meat and dairy products that have enter Northern Ireland through the ‘green lane’ – the majority of voters (51%) are not ‘bothered’ by the development. This is the case with at least three in five ‘neutral’ and nationalist and a majority of ‘slightly unionist’ respondents. Respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionist’ are slightly more bothered than not. Overall, the ‘Not for EU’ labelling bothers 25% of respondents,

Respondents were also asked questions regarding less publicly discussed aspects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework: the rights dimension and north-south cooperation. On the first of these, 36% agree that the UK is delivering on its Protocol/Windsor Framework obligation to ensure no diminution of rights under the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement as a consequence of Brexit. Slightly more (40%) disagree, most (26%) strongly so. Majorities of nationalist and ‘neutral’ respondents agree; a clear majority of unionists disagree. On north-south cooperation, a majority agrees that implementation of the Windsor Framework will lead, as per the original objective of the Protocol, to the maintenance of the ‘necessary conditions for North-South cooperation’ on the island of Ireland; 29% disagree. Majorities of nationalist and ‘neutral’ respondents agree; a clear majority of ‘strongly unionist’ respondents disagree.

A final question in this section concerned whether with the Windsor Framework the Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should now be restored and fully functioning. Almost two-thirds of respondents (64%) agree, most (58%) strongly. Almost a third (31%) disagree, again most (25%) strongly. Very few respondents (5%) were either of no view or neutral on the matter. The figures remain almost unchanged from either June 2023 (65% agree; 30% disagree) when the same question was asked or October 2022 when respondents were asked whether an agreement on addressing issues concerning on the Protocol should lead to a return of devolved government in Northern Ireland (65% agree; 32% disagree). As with the previous polls, those disagreeing with the restoration of the Assembly and Executive now that the Windsor Framework has been agreed were overwhelmingly – by a ratio of almost 5:1 – those identifying as ‘strongly unionist’; respondents identifying as ‘slightly unionist’ were more likely to agree to the Assembly and Executive being restored.

Brexit… and what might come next

The last section of the poll turned to broader questions about Brexit. A first set of questions considered some perceived and anticipated effects (See Figure 9). On whether Brexit is delivering the benefits envisaged by the Leave campaign, only 9% of respondents agree; the overwhelming majority (81%) disagree, most (62%) strongly. On whether, knowing what they know now about Brexit, respondents would have voted differently in the 2016 referendum, only a minority (15%) agree. Most respondents (77%) would vote as they did in 2016. Of those who would now vote differently, ‘leave’ voters outnumber ‘remain’ voters by a ratio of more than 4:1.

A majority of respondents (58%) are also of the view that Brexit has made a united Ireland more likely; less than half that proportion (28%) disagree. A small majority (52%) see Brexit as leading to a centralisation of power in Westminster at the expense of devolution. Other respondents are split equally between those who are ‘neutral’ or ‘don’t knows’ (24%) and those who disagree (24%).

As for options concering the UK’s post-Brexit relations with the EU, a clear majority of respondents (69%) agrees that the UK should pursue closer relations with the EU to reduce further the need for formalities, checks and controls on the movement of goods; less than a quarter of that figure (17%) disagree. The majority figure is slightly down on June 2023 (72%) when the question specified the movement of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland there should be closer UK-EU ties. As in June 2023, more of those identifying as unionist want to see the UK and EU pursue closer relations than do not, with two thirds of ‘slightly unionist’ respondents supporting closer relations.

Figure 9. Brexit… and what might come next (%)

Finally, the poll asked whether future UK governments should rule out the option of the UK rejoining the EU. Just under a third of respondents (31%) agree that they should. A majority (59%) disagree, preferring to keep the option open.

Written comments on Brexit

Views on Brexit expressed in the optional written comments section of the poll were overwhelmingly negative. However, views were divided. Some comments presented Brexit as a mess, a folly, and a problem.

“Brexit has been a disaster for the UK as a whole and caused political turmoil here. Those who supported and championed Brexit in NI showed such bad judgement and total lack of strategic planning.”

“Brexit is, was, and always will be one of the greatest self-inflicted damages ever committed by the UK.”

“Brexit fractured the political discourse in NI. It is unforgivable.”

“The problem was never the Windsor Framework or the Protocol or the Backstop. The problem was always Brexit. It has stirred up unnecessary tension in our community.”

A smaller number of comments expressed that Brexit had either not been delivered or, if it had been, in name only, particularly as far as Northern Ireland is concerned.

“Brexit has not been delivered. It is Brexit in name only. There are too many politicians with self-interests and no desire to make Brexit work by ditching ALL EU red tape regulations.”

“Northern Ireland didn’t get Brexit. Act of Union was changed without consent and needs to be restored or Stormont may never return.”

“Brexit has not been “done”.”

“Voted to leave the EU. Northern Ireland still subject to EU law. Leaving the EU hasn’t happened.”

 

The report is available to download here: